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ABSTRACT 
In the near future, large, complex, time-critical missions, such as 
disaster relief, will likely require multiple unmanned vehicle (UV) 
operators, each controlling multiple vehicles, to combine their 
efforts as a team.  However, is the effort of the team equal to the 
sum of the operator’s individual efforts?  To help answer this 
question, a discrete event simulation model of a team of human 
operators, each performing supervisory control of multiple 
unmanned vehicles, was developed.  The model consists of 
exogenous and internal inputs, operator servers, and a task 
allocation mechanism that disseminates events to the operators 
according to the team structure and state of the system.  To 
generate the data necessary for model building and validation, an 
experimental test-bed was developed where teams of three 
operators controlled multiple UVs by using a simulated ground 
control station software interface.  The team structure and inter-
arrival time of exogenous events were both varied in a 2x2 full 
factorial design to gather data on the impact on system 
performance that occurs as a result of changing both exogenous 
and internal inputs. From the data that was gathered, the model 
was able to replicate the empirical results within a 95% 
confidence interval for all four treatments, however more 
empirical data is needed to build confidence in the model’s 
predictive ability. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.6.3 [Computing Methodologies]: Simulation and Modeling – 
applications.  
General Terms 
Performance, Experimentation, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Discrete event simulation, human factors, modeling, team 
performance, supervisory control, unmanned vehicles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are currently in use for numerous 
military operations, but they are also being considered for many 
non-military applications as well, including mining, fighting 
forest fires, border patrol and supporting police [1]. Currently, 
several human operators are required to control many of today’s 
UVs, but futuristic systems will invert the operator-to-UV ratio so 
that one operator can control multiple UVs [2].  To accomplish 
this goal, the level of automation will have to increase such that 
operators will give high-level, supervisory instructions to the UVs 
instead of manual control [3].  However, previous research  has 
shown that even under supervisory control, there is a cognitive 
limit as to the number of UVs a single human operator can 
effectively manage [4, 5].   Large, complex, time-critical 
missions, such as disaster relief, will likely exceed that limit and 
will require multiple operators, each controlling multiple UVs, to 
combine their efforts. Since such systems do not currently exist, 
many questions arise, including: (1) How many operators are 
necessary to achieve a set of mission objectives?  (2) How should 
the operators combine their efforts in the most effective way?  (3) 
Will the group performance be more than, equal to, or less than 
the sum of the individual contributions?   
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this research is to develop a quantitative model of a 
team of human operators, each performing supervisory control of 
multiple unmanned vehicles, in time-critical environments. This 
model would allow stakeholders, such as vehicle designers and 
battlefield commanders, to vary input parameters, such as vehicle 
speed and number of human operators, in order to determine their 
impact on system performance.  
3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
3.1 Queuing Model of Supervisory Control of 
Unmanned Vehicles 
Supervisory control of unmanned vehicles involves an operator 
handling intermittent events via an automated system by giving 
high-level commands to UVs.  As such, supervisory control of 
unmanned vehicles has been previously modeled as a queuing 
system where the vehicles requesting assistance are regarded as 
users and the human operators are regarded as servers [6].  For 
instance, in a simple surveillance scenario whose timeline is 
shown in Figure 1, an unidentified contact suddenly emerges at 
time t. This event, labeled A, requires that the operator perform a 
task, in this case, assign an UV to the contact location for further 
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investigation.  Since this event is not directly controllable by the 
operator or vehicle, it is considered to be an exogenous event to 
the system. Ideally, the operator would notice this event and start 
“servicing” it immediately by performing the associated task.  
However, because of inherent inefficiencies of human attention, 
the operator will inadvertently introduce a delay between the 
arrival of this event and the moment he starts to service it (marked 
by event B in the timeline).  This delay is due to a combination of 
the Wait Time due to loss of Situational Awareness (WTSA) and 
the Wait Time due to Interaction (WTI) [4].  WTSA occurs when 
the operator is not aware that the event requires his attention, 
whereas WTI occurs when the operator has noticed the event, but 
has not measurably started the associated task yet (perhaps due to 
deciding between the right course of action from a number of 
options). Since it is extremely difficult to separate WTSA from 
WTI, the measured time between when an event emerges and 
when the operator starts the associated task (assuming the 
operator is not busy and has the resources available to service the 
event) will be considered WTOD – wait time due to operator 
delay.  Cummings and Mitchell [4] have shown that this delay can 
be quite significant particularly when operators are controlling 
multiple vehicles simultaneously and have degraded situational 
awareness.   
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of events for simple UV scenario. 
 
The task of assigning a vehicle to a location also takes a finite 
amount of time known as the Service Time (ST).  At the moment 
when the operator finishes assigning a vehicle (C in Figure 1), that 
vehicle will begin to travel the assigned location.   The time 
during which the vehicle is travelling is referred to as the Travel 
Time (TT) and in this scenario also represents the Neglect Time 
(NT) of the vehicle, since the vehicle acts autonomously during 
this period without requiring the operator’s attention [7].  After 
some time, the vehicle will eventually arrive at the contact 
location, denoted by event D.  Similar to the time between A and 
B, the vehicle must wait a finite period of time before the operator 
begins to interact with the vehicle’s camera, denoted by event E.  
Finally, after another service time, the operator finishes 
identifying the contact (labeled event F) which may more may not 
spawn additional endogenous events, depending upon the 
scenario.  If the final objective of the operator is to simply identify 
unknown contacts, then the difference in time between event F 
(when the final objective is met) and event A (when the contact 
emerged) is known as the Objective Completion Time (OCT).   
Since time is of the essence in many UV applications, the goal of 
many UV system designers and decision makers it to minimize 
the average OCT for a given scenario. 
3.1.1 Multiple Event Handling 
3.1.1.1 Wait Time due to Queuing 
If an operator is busy interacting with a vehicle and another event 
emerges that requires the operator’s attention, then that event must 
wait for the operator to become available.  This additional time, 
not represented in Figure 1, is known as the wait time due to 
queuing (WTQ) since the event is considered to be in the queue 
for the operator’s attention. Since vehicles tend to produce 
endogenous events (such as requiring new waypoints when they 
have reached the old ones), as the number of vehicles or 
exogenous events in the system increases, the probability of an 
event experiencing WTQ grows.  Additionally, it has been shown 
that operators may take longer to respond to events as they 
emerge due to high workload and a loss of situational awareness 
[4]. Thus, as more events require the operator’s attention, the 
OCT will continue to grow until it reaches an unacceptable level, 
at which point a team of multiple operators will likely be required. 
3.1.1.2 Switching Strategy 
If more than one event is in the operator’s queue, the operator 
must select which event he will service next.  There are several 
strategies an operator can use, including first-in-first-out (FIFO), 
highest-priority-first or even random selection. Switching strategy 
affects the total time tasks spend waiting for service not only 
because of the ordering of the tasks (queuing policy), but also 
because of the time required for the mental model change of the 
operator (switching cost) if the tasks are dissimilar [8].  It has 
been demonstrated that for operators of multiple, unmanned 
vehicles, the switching cost can be substantial [9]. 
3.2 Single Operator Discrete Event 
Simulation Model 
Solving traditional queuing models can yield results of interest to 
the study of supervisory control such as the average time an event 
will spend waiting in a queue and server (operator) utilization.  
Although analytical solutions are possible for simple supervisory 
control systems, often the assumptions required for closed-form 
solutions, such as steady-state behavior and independent arrivals, 
are not met.  Discrete event simulations (DES) overcome many of 
the limitations of analytical models by using computational 
methods that do not require such strict assumptions [10] and 
therefore allow a richer set of complex UV-operator systems to be 
modeled.    
A single human operator controlling heterogeneous unmanned 
vehicles was successfully modeled using a Multi-UV Discrete 
Event Simulation (MUV-DES) model [8]. A Multi-UV, Multi-
Operator Discrete Event Simulation (MUVMO-DES) model that 
builds upon this work, but also considers multiple operators 
combining their efforts, is the focus of this research.  This new 
model consists of exogenous and internal inputs, operator servers 
and their interactions, and a task allocation mechanism that 
disseminates events to the operators according to the team 
structure and state of the system. The inputs to the model are both 
exogenous, such as the arrival rate of new contacts, and also 
internal, such as the length of time an operator spends interacting 
with a vehicle.  These inputs are also stochastic due to the large 
amount of uncertainty in environmental conditions and human 
behavior.   
4. METHODS 
4.1 Multi-UV, Multi-Operator Discrete Event 
Simulation Model 
Expanding the MUV-DES model to multiple operators required 
several new considerations, in particular a model of team 
communication, mutual performance monitoring and task 
allocation. 
4.1.1 Modeling Communication 
Geographically-disperse UV operators communicate through 
voice, chat or a combination of both.  Voice communication is 
typically the fastest and allows operators the ability to control the 
UVs while simultaneously communicating via a headset. Voice 
communication is effective for small teams but can become 
problematic as the number of operators becomes large, due to 
multiple voice messages that occur simultaneously.  Thus, voice 
communications are typically serial in nature, meaning only one 
operator can speak at a time.  Chat messages allow operators to 
send messages to each other asynchronously and in parallel.  Due 
to software’s ability to parse text and apply sorting filters in real-
time, chat communication often scales well with large teams.  
Chat messages also tend to be clearer than voice communication, 
in that they are not as susceptible to noisy communication 
channels, background noise, volume or operator accents.  
Furthermore, chat messages automatically create a real-time 
transcript of the communication, something that is typically not 
possible with voice. For the initial MUVMO-DES model, 
communications are assumed to be chat for data gathering 
purposes, but given the widespread use of chat by operational 
command and control personnel, this assumption also carries 
external validity. Modeling voice communications is left for 
future work. 
4.1.2 Mutual Performance Monitoring 
In addition to explicit communications, operators may also 
coordinate by mutual performance monitoring, recognized as one 
of the core components of teamwork [11]. Through a user 
interface, operators can typically view each other’s vehicles and 
commands to gain situation awareness of what the team is doing.  
For instance, instead of explicitly communicating, an operator 
may take a quick look at the interface to see if any other 
operator’s vehicles are already heading to a new contact before 
assigning their own.  However, because this form of coordination 
is unilateral, teammates must make assumptions about the actions 
and intentions of other teammates which may or may not be valid. 
4.1.3 Modeling Coordination 
Communication and mutual performance monitoring can be 
represented by discrete endogenous events that the operators 
generate.  For instance, in Figure 2, instead of servicing an event 
once it arrives (event A), an operator may choose to send a chat 
message to other operators by first starting a chat message, 
composing it for a finite period of time (labeled COORD) and 
then sending it before starting to service the task (event C). 
Similarly, an operator may perform a mutual performance 
monitoring task that also takes a finite period of time.  However, 
if an operator is composing a chat message or monitoring the 
performance of other operators, then the operator is considered to 
be busy and as such, any event that is waiting for the operator’s 
attention while he is communicating or monitoring will incur a 
WTQ for that period of time.  This additional WTQ represents a 
quantitative measurement of the coordination cost (process loss) 
associated with the team performance.  
The timeline shown in Figure 2 is a simple example of 
coordination but more complex coordination scenarios exist as 
well.  For simple tasks, a single communication message may be 
all that is needed, such as claiming responsibility for a target that 
emerges. For more complex tasks, the communication may 
involve a conversation that spawns several iterations of 
communication messages.  This initial model will only assume 
single communication messages and as such, will only be able to 
model simple coordination between the team members. 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of events with coordination. 
 
4.1.3.1 Coordination Strategies 
Similar to switching strategies, an operator will also have a 
coordination strategy that dictates the type and timing of the 
coordination he will perform when faced with a task that can be 
serviced by more than one operator.  One such strategy is to not 
coordinate at all, but this would require the team to have 
predefined roles and responsibilities (such as mechanistic teams) 
or run a high risk of task allocation errors.  A task allocation error 
occurs when more than one operator or no operator attempts to 
service a particular task.   
If an operator choose to coordinate her actions, she typically must 
choose the type of coordination first, i.e. whether or not to 
communicate, monitor or both.  In addition to the type of 
coordination, the timing of the coordination is very important as 
well.  A common strategy would be to coordinate first and then 
service the task. This type of coordination strategy is the least 
likely to incur task allocation errors. This coordination strategy 
was assumed for the initial MUVMO-DES model. However, other 
coordination strategies exist. For instance, an operator could 
service the task first and then send a courtesy message to other 
operators. This strategy allows the operator to give the fastest 
response to an event, but raises the possibility that another 
operator will also begin servicing the task before the first operator 
gets a chance to send the coordination message. 
4.1.3.2 Team Structure and Task Allocation 
Although the model was designed to be general and handle a 
variety of team structures, mechanistic and organic teams 
structures were chosen to be modeled initially since they represent 
two polar opposites of the organizational spectrum [12]. A 
mechanistic team is one where the operators have rigidly defined 
roles and responsibilities. For instance, when all of the vehicles of 
one type are assigned to one and only one operator, then that 
operator is given the full responsibility for performing the tasks 
that only that vehicle can do. If one of each vehicle type is 
allocated to each operator instead, then that team structure would 
be considered organic since any operator can perform any task 
that arises, provided that he has an appropriate vehicle available.  
Both team structures suffer from inefficiencies, or what Steiner  
[13] refers to as a “process loss” which is the differential between 
the performance of a team and the theoretical  maximum achieved 
if the efforts of the individuals were combined ideally. In 
mechanistic teams, process loss occurs when task loads are 
uneven and some operators are too busy while others are idle.  In 
organic teams, process loss occur when operators have to spend 
time coordinating how they will share the common queue and/or 
allocate the tasks amongst themselves in a sub-optimal manner.  
Due to the clear task allocation roles, extending the MUV-DES 
model for mechanistic teams involved having a separate queue 
and server for each operator.  Since each task was unique to an 
operator, every event that arose was automatically assigned to the 
appropriate operator.       
For the organic team, a different task allocation mechanism was 
needed.  Since the model is merely an abstraction of the actual 
scenario, the first attempt at an organic model randomly assigned 
the tasks to the operators based on who was available at that 
moment to service the event.  If more than one operator was 
available, the event was randomly assigned to one of the available 
operators. If no operator was available, the event waited in a 
common queue (incurring a WTQ cost) until an operator became 
available. This form of modeling assumes that there will be no 
task allocation errors, i.e. one and only one operator will service 
or attempt to service any particular task. In real organic teams, 
this will likely only happen if the teams coordinate their actions 
through communication or mutual performance monitoring.    
4.2 Data Gathering 
The MUVMO-DES model utilizes stochastic processes to account 
for the uncertainty within the system.  Therefore, random values 
are drawn for WTOD, service time, communication time, 
monitoring time, travel times and travel time in the model.  These 
probability density functions (pdfs) need to be generated by 
binning empirical data into histograms and fitting an appropriate 
curve. 
To generate the stochastic inputs necessary for model building 
and to validate the model’s outputs against actual team 
performance metrics, real data must be gathered. Since there are 
no extant systems of teams of operators each controlling multiple 
unmanned vehicles, there is no “real world” data to collect.  
Hence, an experimental test-bed where teams of operators 
controlled multiple UVs was specifically developed and 
experimental trials were conducted to gather the data used for 
model building and validation. 
 
Figure 3: Main display of the ground control interface. 
 
4.2.1 Experimental Test-Bed 
The experimental test-bed consisted of a video game-like 
simulation of unmanned vehicle control by a team of operators.  
The simulation included three ground control stations, with one 
subject assigned to each station.  
4.2.2 Ground Control Interface 
Subjects interacted with the ground control stations via a 
computer monitor display using standard keyboard and mouse 
inputs. The main display of the ground control station featured 
three sections – a large map, a chat panel and a system panel 
(Figure 3). The map represented the geographical area that the 
operators were responsible for, as well as all the vehicles under 
their control and contacts that they needed to handle. Contacts and 
vehicles were represented using MIL-STD-2525B icons [14] and 
the operators assigned vehicles to contacts by clicking on the map 
interface with the mouse. The operators were also able to 
communicate with each other via instant messaging within the 
chat interface window. Operators would type messages into the 
chat, which would then appear on all the other operator’s chat 
panels instantly. Chat messages were labeled with the operators 
unique IDs, which corresponded to the labels for each operator’s 
vehicle icons. In addition to the map and chat display, there was 
also a system panel where the system would occasionally send 
messages to a particular operator, such as a confirmation message 
that the operator had assigned a particular vehicle to travel to a 
particular location.  
4.2.3 Tasks 
Each mission scenario required a team of operators to “handle” 
contacts that appear intermittently over the map. To do this, the 
team of operators needed to perform both assignment and payload 
tasks. 
4.2.3.1 Assignment Tasks 
Assignment tasks required the operators to send their vehicles to 
the contacts on the map as they emerged.  Once assigned, the UV 
would start to travel to that particular contact location on the map 
in a straight line and would continue until either the vehicle 
reached its assigned destination or the operator re-assigned the 
vehicle elsewhere. There were no obstacles on any of the maps 
and no path-planning required.  
Although assignments were done by individual operators, they 
can be considered a “team task” since the operators had to 
coordinate their assignments to ensure that one and only one 
vehicle was assigned to each and every contact.  Furthermore, 
subjects were instructed that vehicles should be chosen in the 
interest of minimizing travel times, i.e. typically the closest 
available vehicle to the contact location. 
4.2.3.2 Payload Task 
Once a vehicle reached a contact, the operator performed a simple 
task by interacting with the vehicle’s payload. This task was 
unique to the vehicle and contact type, but involved either visual 
identification (e.g., where is the red truck in the parking lot?) or a 
simple hand-eye coordination task. Since all three vehicles were 
aerial of some sort, all payload tasks involved a birds-eye view of 
the terrain.  An example of a hand-eye coordination task is shown 
in Figure 4 where the operator must destroy a contact by centering 
the crosshairs over a stationary target on the ground and pressing 
the fire button three times.  The difficulty in this task was that the 
crosshairs are subject to jitter due to the motion of the UV. The 
other hand-eye coordination task involved dropping aid packages 
to victims on the ground.  This task was similar to the destruction 
task except that the crosshairs were steady but the projectiles were 
slow-falling and susceptible to the wind. Thus, players had to 
compensate for a light north-east wind, for instance, by aiming 
packages slightly to the southwest of the target location and 
pressing the drop button once.  Payload tasks are considered an 
“individual task” as they do not require any coordination or 
assistance from any of the other operators.   
 
 
Figure 4: Missile firing payload task. 
 
4.2.3.3 Scenario Objectives 
The objective of each scenario was to identify all unidentified 
contacts and either rescue them (if friendly) or destroy them (if 
hostile) as quickly as possible.  There were three vehicle types, 
one that handles each type of contact (unidentified, friendly, 
hostile) exclusively. Although any UV of the appropriate type 
could be assigned to a contact, only the first vehicle to start the 
payload task could successfully complete it.  When a contact first 
appeared on the map, it was always of the unidentified type, 
which required a scouting UV (Type A). Once the scouting UV 
arrived, the operator performed a visual identification task which 
transformed the contact from unidentified to either hostile or 
friendly.  If the contact was identified as being hostile, a tactical 
UV (Type B) was sent by an operator to the contact location to 
destroy it via the missile firing task.  Similarly, if an unidentified 
contact was identified as being friendly, a rescue UV (Type C) 
was sent by an operator instead to drop aid packages to the 
contacts’ location, thereby “rescuing” the contact.  The time a 
contact spent in the system, from the moment it arrived, until the 
moment it was successfully handled, was the objective completion 
time. Since a scenario consisted of multiple contacts, the Average 
Objective Completion Time (AOCT) was the metric of interest, 
where the average was simply the mean of all the OCTs for that 
scenario. 
4.2.3.3.1 Design of Experiments 
A 2x2 repeated measures experiment was conducted where the 
independent variables were team structure (mechanistic, organic) 
and the inter-arrival time of unidentified contacts (constant, 
erratic).  Ten teams of three participants each completed all four 
treatments. The order of trials was counter-balanced and randomly 
assigned to the teams. An alpha value of 0.05 was used for 
significance. 
4.2.4 Independent Variables 
4.2.4.1 Inter-Arrival Times of Exogenous Events 
Previous research has demonstrated that optimal UV operator 
performance occurs when the operator has a utilization lower than 
70% [15].  Thus, all scenarios were designed to have an operator 
utilization of about 50%, meaning that operators spent 
approximately 50% of their time, on average, performing 
assignment or payload tasks.  This was achieved in pilot studies 
by fixing the payload tasks and manipulating the number of 
exogenous events and their inter-arrival times until the average 
operator utilization was about 50%.   
The experimental trials had a total of 16 exogenous events 
(unidentified contacts emerging).  The time between successive 
exogenous events (the inter-arrival time) was 30 seconds for the 
constant treatment. For the erratic factor level, the inter-arrival 
times were generated from a bimodal distribution where the 
means of the modes were set at 75 seconds and 225 seconds from 
the start of the trial, with a standard deviation of 15 seconds.  In 
both the constant and bimodal treatments, the first exogenous 
event always appeared at time 0, thus only 15 events were drawn 
from the bimodal distribution for the erratic condition.  The inter-
arrival of exogenous events was varied between constant and 
erratic to determine if team structure had an effect on how 
operators performed under different task load distributions.   
4.2.5 Participants 
Participants were recruited via e-mail and paper advertisements 
and through word-of-mouth. All of the participants were between 
the ages of 18 and 35, with the mean age being 21.7. Some 
participants had military, video game or previous UV experiment 
experience. Due to scheduling concerns, some teams were 
composed of individuals who knew each other while most teams 
were composed of individuals who were randomly assigned.  The 
level of inter-personal relationships between team members 
(stranger, casual acquaintance, friend, romantic, etc) was not 
recorded. 
4.2.5.1 Training 
Prior to the experimental trials, the participants completed an 
individual 20-minute PowerPoint® training session.  Afterwards, 
the participants completed two practice scenarios (one 
mechanistic and one organic) as teams, each one taking about 10 
minutes to complete.   Thus, the total training time was 
approximately 40 minutes. 
5. RESULTS 
The order of the trials was checked to determine if a learning 
factor occurred across the four team sessions. Given that the 
training time was minimal, and previous research has shown that 
four or more training sessions is needed for teams to achieve 
stable performance [16], testing order was of concern, and showed 
a significant effect (F(3, 24) = 4.12, p=.02). Most teams did worse 
on the first trial, regardless of the treatment, than on subsequent 
trials (Figure 5). Thus, the final statistical model included a two 
factor, repeated measures ANOVA with blocking on the trial 
order. 
Team structure was significant (F(1, 24) = 1.484, p < 0.01), with 
mechanistic teams performing better than organic teams overall, 
although there was no significant difference when the inter-arrival 
rate was erratic.  Mechanistic teams performed worse when the 
inter-arrival rate was erratic as opposed to constant (t(15.8) = 
2.47, p = 0.03). However the inter-arrival rate had no significant 
effect on the organic teams.  The inter-arrival rate by itself was 
not significant, but the interaction of the independent variables 
was (F(1, 24) = 10.47, p = 0.04).  
  
Figure 5: Effect of AOCT vs trial order. 
 
5.1 Model Results 
The model was run 1000 times for each treatment condition.  For 
the organic team, the model predictions were within the 95% 
confidence interval of the empirical results for all four treatments 
(Figure 6). Since the mechanistic teams did not have to coordinate 
their actions due to their rigid role structure, they were initially 
modeled without any communication or monitoring behavior.  In 
the erratic inter-arrival condition, the model predictions for the 
mechanistic team was within the 95% confidence interval, 
however for the constant inter-arrival condition, the model’s 
predictions were low (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Initial empirical results. 
Upon further investigation of the experimental transcripts, the 
mechanistic team did communicate and monitor each other’s 
actions, even though it was not necessary. Thus, a coordination 
strategy similar to that used by the organic team was implemented 
in the mechanistic model and new outputs were generated.  Not 
surprisingly, the additional cost associated with coordination 
increased the OCT of the mechanistic team. Thus, with the 
coordination strategy implemented in both teams, the model 
predictions were within the 95% confidence interval for all four 
treatment conditions (Figure 7).   
 
 
Figure 7: Revised empirical results.  
6.    DISCUSSION 
It was not surprising that the mechanistic teams performed worse 
under erratic inter-arrival times than they did when the inter-
arrival times were constant, since the erratic inter-arrival times 
caused events to arrive in batches, thereby increasing the queues.  
However, it was interesting that there was no significant 
difference in the performance of the organic team under the 
different inter-arrival rates of exogenous events.  This suggests 
that even though events arrived in clusters during the erratic inter-
arrival treatment, the organic team was able to handle the 
workload spike without increasing the AOCT.  This suggests that 
the organic team is more robust to environmental uncertainty than 
mechanistic teams due to their flexible structure and the ability to 
spread tasks across the team. 
It was predicted that mechanistic teams would perform better than 
organic teams, which they did, but not necessarily for the same 
reasons. Originally, mechanistic teams were thought to have an 
advantage over organic teams because they did not incur 
coordination costs.  As shown in the results, mechanistic teams do 
incur coordination costs and without taking these costs into 
consideration, the performance predictions are too low in the 
constant inter-arrival case. This is interesting because the 
communications are theoretically unnecessary. However, this 
highlights the importance of understanding the intrinsic need for 
communication between team members, even if it is not 
necessary. Future work should look at how to mitigate such 
communication overhead.  
So, if mechanistic teams are also incurring coordination costs, 
how are they still managing to perform better overall than organic 
teams?  The answer to this question perhaps lies in the fact that 
the empirical data used to generated the pdfs for the different 
sources (e.g. travel times, WTOD, service times) was separated 
into the four different treatment conditions. Although there was no 
statistically significant difference between the values and the 
differences could be attributed to sampling error, there were small 
differences in nearly every input condition.  Since the OCT is the 
sum of all of these individual times, then these differences (or 
errors) combine into a statistically significant result.   
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Other factors may play a role as well, such as the switching 
strategy of the operators. The switching strategy assumed for all 
of the operators was FIFO, although in many cases, operators did 
not adhere to this strategy. Thus, future analysis should determine 
the actual switching strategies observed in the experimental trials 
and implement those instead. 
Another issue is that statistical significance for data such as 
WTOD was difficult to obtain due to a number of factors.  First, 
the sample size of the experiment was small (n = 10) but this is 
not unusual for team studies since it takes multiple participants to 
form a single experimental unit. Increasing the sample size should 
reduce the standard error of the experimental results.  
Additionally, previous research has shown that UAV teams do not 
reach asymptotic performance levels until after they have 
completed around four sessions together [16].  Although this is 
likely to be highly contingent upon a number of factors such as 
the difficulty of the task, the inter-operability required for success 
and the length of the sessions, it does seem to be consistent with 
our results.  Thus, to further reduce variability in the experimental 
results, additional practice sessions should be added.  Finally, the 
experiment was not controlled for the skill level or the 
relationships of the individuals.  Factors such as age, video game 
experience and military background could have had an effect on 
individual performance.  If a reduction in the variability of the 
team’s performance is desired, then future experiments could 
select for and block on particular individual traits.  However, 
teams of futuristic UV operators may be just as diverse as the 
sample population, particularly if they are composed of 
individuals from different agencies or even nations operating via 
an interoperability standards [17]. These operators may have 
different levels of training, skills and attitudes which may result in 
significantly different levels of individual performance.  Thus, it 
is not necessarily a flaw in the experimental design to have 
diversity in regards to the individual traits, as it can be argued that 
such diversity will be likely in future UV systems.   
7. FUTURE WORK 
The model in this paper has successfully replicated the results of 
experimental trials, but it has not been used to predict the 
performance of teams in hypothetical situations. Future work will 
look at developing the model to predict the performance of teams 
in new scenarios and then verify those results empirically. One 
such scenario could be if the teams had an additional member or 
decision support tool that aided in task allocation. While the 
mechanistic teams performed better than organic teams overall, 
the fact that the mechanistic teams were more sensitive to 
variations in the environment suggests that this team architecture 
may not be ideal for volatile environments such as those found in 
command and control settings.  If an organic team had the benefit 
of a leader or decision support tool, then its coordination costs 
might drop significantly, whereas a leader or decision support tool 
would likely have little or no effect on a mechanistic team.  Thus, 
the team model could be updated to see just how much of a 
performance difference one could expect by having a leader or 
decision support tool in both team structures.  
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